Testing the Waters

The world has gotten accustomed to the visuals of Chinese naval vessels ramming Japanese, Vietnamese and Filipino ships, mostly fishing vessels, in international waters, claiming them as their EEZ. However, under the shadow of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, a seemingly minor incident threatens to raise the stakes once again in the South China Seas.

On October 22^nd, as per the Philippines government, a Chinese Coast Guard intruded into the territorial waters of the Philippines and rammed a Philippines resupply boat about 25 km from the Second Thomas Shoal. Predictably, the Philippines summoned the Chinese ambassador for his nation's “illegal and dangerous” international behaviour.

What made the situation really interesting was the American response delivered at the highest level. In the backdrop of the visit of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Washington, apparently to decide on a common strategy for the worsening Middle East crisis, President Biden declared, "I want to be very clear: The United States defence commitment to the Philippines is ironclad. Any attack on the Filipino aircraft, vessels, or armed forces will invoke our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines.”

The Chinese response was swift in the coming, stating that “The US defence commitment to the Philippines should not undermine China's sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, nor should it support the illegal claims of the Philippines.”

Background

Just like China has serious issues with naming the Indian Ocean, similar sentiments are being espoused in the littoral countries of the South China Sea. They seriously oppose this name as it, in their opinion, presumes Chinese sovereignty over this maritime area even without a shot being fired. China, of course, would be very pleased if things worked out this way. If the opposition is cowed down just by a show of belligerence, the PLAN can stretch its control over the entire South China Sea without risking an all-out war.

The Second Thomas Shoal is located very close to the Spratly Islands. Many countries have disputed these islands, including China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei.

For the Philippines, the issue here is mainly about the fishing rights of its fishermen, whose very existence depends upon these rich fishing grounds. But the Chinese do not view it as a mere infringement into fishing fields whose ownership is disputed, something that routinely takes place between India and Sri Lanka across the Palk Straits without either nation contemplating a war. For Beijing, the Second Thomas Shoal sits on the outer periphery of the line it has drawn on maps to define its ownership of the resource-rich Spratly Islands. The Spratly Islands sit astride major maritime trade routes to Northeast Asia. This gives them a significant geostrategic advantage. The islands themselves can be used to monitor naval activity in the South China Sea.

Analysis

The Philippines is one of the countries on the outer periphery of China. This region has traditionally been just beyond the reach of the Chinese centre. Historically, interactions between Manila and Beijing were minimal.

All this changed during the Cold War. The Philippines has always had a strong American influence. It was a part of the informal American empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a relationship that has endured despite many hiccups. When communist guerrillas waged an armed insurgency in the Philippines, the U.S. suspected Chinese mischief. This mutual suspicion reached a crescendo during the height of the Cold War, and the autocratic regime of Ferdinand Marcos received the unstinted support of Washington during those trying days. The Philippine military was strengthened, and American dollars poured into the country.

President Ferdinand Marcos Junior won the elections on the platform of more robust policies against China. His predecessor, former President Duterte's China-friendly pivot, failed to make any impression over the six years he was in power. Duterte desperately wooed Beijing, even setting aside his country's territorial contest with China in the South China Sea. This did not please the Americans, who made no secret of a successor who would "steer away from the defeatist attitude displayed by the current leadership" and more firmly challenge China's claims, as stated in a December report published by the Asia Society Policy Institute.

President Ferdinand Marcos Junior began his tenure with a reformist/ soft approach, which he soon realised was untenable. There is growing Chinese encroachment in the national waters of the Philippines and its neighbouring countries. One way to interpret this is to see it as an existential threat to the very existence of the Philippines as an independent country. This is the viewpoint that is promulgated by nationalists within the Philippines.

However, there has to be a pragmatic approach to this problem. The hard reality is that the Chinese superpower is here to stay one way or another. So, if smaller nations are incapable of meeting China militarily, and their distant supporters are too far away to fight their battles, perhaps making a compromise may result in a few concessions in the end. The alternative is risking losing all in a one-sided military contest. The dilemma lies in the fact that President Duterte tried all this without making any serious headway in securing a modicum of benefits for his own country; China is wary of making any concessions that, in the longer run, would set a precedent, initiating a chain of demands by the multitude of claimants of the South China Sea.

This is also a sensitive issue in the domestic politics of the Philippines; any concessions to China that will forsake the rights of the Philippines over the rich fishing grounds of the South China Sea are anathema to the influential fishing community.

So, where do China and the Philippines go from here? Both countries do not want an escalation in this confrontation. Beijing got the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 using lethal force. Territorially, this was a gain for China. But morally, this was a loss as in the wider community of nations, Chinese disregard for the rule of law was fully exposed, sending a grim warning to all its neighbours, including India that when it comes to territory, over land or sea, the dragon will operate on the margins of international law.

Another possibility is that of international arbitration. This was tried in the year 2016. The Permanent Court of Arbitration appointed a tribunal of arbitrators. These arbitrators were completely unbiased. The ruling, which eventually came out, did not go in the favour of Beijing, but again, it refused to compile, and both sides lived to fight another day.

The Indian Perspective

Sandwiched between Pakistan, a vowed Chinese ally, and Sri Lanka and Nepal, both deeply in Chinese debt, India is desperately short of allies to confront Beijing with its own domain of South Asia. It is, therefore, desperate to seek pressure points against China further away, in its near abroad.

While New Delhi has no direct stakes in the dispute between China and the Philippines, it would not hesitate to make things difficult for the PLAN. Stopping Chinese naval expansion is a priority for India. The Indian government is already working with like-minded countries like Vietnam, providing it with sophisticated weaponry, including naval ships. This strategy could be expanded to other countries like the Philippines. India has been steadily upgrading its military-to-military ties with ASEAN nations through joint exercises, training, and, increasingly, military supplies. For example, India and the Philippines have already signed a $375 million deal supplying three batteries of the shore-based anti-ship systems of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles,

At the end of the day, this is not about India scoring brownie points against China. Rather, it is New Delhi standing up for the concept of territorial sovereignty against Chinese aggression when it itself is a victim of the same. This was the intent while holding the inaugural ASEAN India Maritime Exercise (AIME-2023) in the South China Sea on 08 May 2023. ASEAN naval ships from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam carried out naval manoeuvres with Indian Navy ships, sending a message to Beijing.