Contours for a resolution to the Kashmir conflict
May 30, 2019 | Expert Insights
INTRODUCTION
The first conflict between India and Pakistan, over the state of J&K, broke out in Oct, 1948. Since then, there have been at least three other overt conflicts in 1965, 1971 and 1999. For the last three decades, India has accused Pakistan of instigating violence in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan has denied any role in the conflict, claiming the violence to be an indigenous movement. Indian diplomats claim that Pakistan is practising the doctrine of ‘Plausible Deniability’; by providing sanctuary, training, administrative and operational support to terrorist groups, yet diplomatically denying involvement.
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR DURABLE PEACE
The First Opportunity
The Kashmir conflict takes its origins, right from the independence of the two countries in 1947. In October that year, the erstwhile princely state of J&K was invaded by Pakistan Razakars (armed tribals), leading to the rape of the convent at Baramulla and inspiring Maharaja Hari Singh to sign the Instrument of Accession, on 26 October 1947. The first opportunity for peace came after the ceasefire became effective, on 01 January 1949. The UN passed a series of (advisory) resolutions, including a plebiscite. However, only the ceasefire was achieved and the other resolutions were never implemented.
The Second Opportunity
In the aftermath of the 1971 war, the historic Shimla Accord was signed between the then Prime Ministers (PM) of Pakistan and India; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi. In the accord, both countries resolved to settle their differences through bilateral negotiations. They also agreed to convert the ceasefire line to a Line of Control (LOC), which neither side would seek to alter, unilaterally. The Shimla Accord was the second opportunity for peace between the two countries. However, barely two decades after it was ratified by both Pakistan and India, the internal situation in Kashmir deteriorated (1989), and India continues to accuse Pakistan for instigating the violence.
WHAT DO KASHMIRI PEOPLE WANT?
From the Kashmiri perspective, expectations have been repeatedly belied. The youth of the state belongs to a generation brought up on illusions of peace but live in the realities of a police state. Further, a stagnant economy, inadequate infrastructural development, widespread unemployment and rampant corruption have made them despair for the future. For the young people of Kashmir, the history of the conflict is not as consequential as it is to move on; resolve the dispute and bring much-needed peace, development and economic progress.
AIM OF THIS PAPER
This paper attempts to answer a question foremost in the minds of Kashmiri youth; “Why have India and Pakistan failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute, even after seven decades?” In attempting to answer that question, I shall enumerate the stakeholders, make assessments on their perceptions and describe possible end-states.
STAKEHOLDERS TO THE CONFLICT
There are primarily eight stakeholders to the Kashmir conflict:
(a) Muslims of the Kashmir Valley
The Indian Kashmir Valley has a population of approximately 6.9 million. 98% of the population is Muslim of which 90% are Sunni Muslim, with the rest being Shia Muslims. However, all Kashmiri Muslims practise Sufism, a far more moderate form of Islam than what is practised in Pakistan. Muslims in the Indian Kashmir Valley are physically separated by the LOC, from their brethren in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) with this being their major grievance. They are also partially responsible for the exile of the Pandits from the Kashmir Valley.
Comment: India refers to PAK as ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)’, while Pakistan refers to this area as ‘Azad Kashmir.’ To avoid provocation to either party, in this paper, we shall refer to the area as PAK.
(b) Exiled Pandits of Kashmir Valley
In 1947, it was estimated that there were almost two lakh Pandits living in the Kashmir Valley. Thereafter, there has been a continuous decline in Pandit population. After 1989, the Pandits were persecuted by extremist elements in the Valley and by 2011, it was estimated that there were barely three to four thousand Pandits remaining in the Valley. The bulk of Pandits have migrated to Jammu Administrative Division, the National Capital Region (NCR) and even abroad. Successive governments attempted to facilitate the return of the Pandits to the Kashmir Valley, but to little avail. The uncertain security situation in the Valley dissuades the return of Kashmiri Pandits. The total Kashmiri Pandit population, including those in the Valley, Jammu Division, NCR and other places is estimated between 3 to 6 Lakhs.
(c) Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK)
Pakistan has divided PAK into two parts; Azad Kashmir (Pakistan Kashmir Valley) and Gilgit–Baltistan. In the Pakistan Kashmir Valley, Sunni Muslims comprise four million strong and like their brethren in India, practice Sufism. The territory has an autonomous, parliamentary form of government, with its capital located at Muzaffarabad. The unicameral Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly elects both the Prime Minister and President. The President is the constitutional head of state, while the Prime Minister, supported by a Council of Ministers, is the chief executive for the region. The state has its own Supreme Court and a High Court but is not represented in the Parliament of Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan has a population of about 1.8 million, comprising primarily of Tibetans, Baltis, Monpas with some Kashmiri and Chinese.
(d) Ladakh
Ladakh is the most sparsely populated region of J&K with a population of 2.75 Lakhs. It is also closely related to Tibet both in history and culture. While more than 50% of the population is Buddhist there is also a significant Shia-Muslim population, concentrated in Kargil.
(e) Jammu Division
Jammu Division has a population of approximately 5.4 million, with approximately 3.35 million Hindus (62%) and 1.8 million Muslims (33%). Jammu Division has 10 districts and the Hindu population is concentrated mainly in Jammu, Kathua and Udhampur Districts. The five Northern districts of Jammu Division, Rajouri, Poonch, Doda, Kisthtwar and Ramban are of Muslim majority.
(f) Government of India (GOI)
After the signing of the Instrument of Accession in 1947, GOI is probably the most influential stakeholder in J&K. J&K forms an integral part of the Union of India and hence is bound to India’s Constitution. By estimates, there are approximately seven lakh security personnel deployed in the valley, including both armed and para-military forces. The Armed Forces, comprising of both the Army and Air Force are deployed mainly to counter the external threat along the un-demarcated Line of Control (LC) with Pakistan and the un-demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. In the last 72 years, GOI has made significant contributions in infrastructure, including roads, bridges, tunnels, railway lines, hydroelectric projects, hospitals and educational institutions. However, successive state governments have failed to run effective administrations, forcing the GOI to provide disproportionate central assistance to the state.
(g) Government of Pakistan (GOP)
The paradox at the time of Independence was bifurcating British India into the secular Indian state and Islamic Pakistan. Therein also lies the philosophical conflict on Kashmir. In Pakistan, there was popular perception that the Muslim-majority Kingdom of J&K, would accede to Pakistan, even though it was ruled by a Dogra king. However, after the 1947-48 war, the failed UN intervention and the 1971 war, it was apparent to the GOP that military annexation of the state was a futile effort.
(h) Pakistan-based Jihadi Organizations (PJO)
However, a new opportunity came by way of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89). Pakistan was at the forefront of the US-led covert war to liberate Afghanistan. The defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and the collapse of the USSR fuelled the aspirations of militant outfits resulting in pressure on the GOP to replicate a similar strategy in J&K. Three militant organizations which operate on Pakistani soil, and accused of terror in India, are the Jaish-e-Mohamed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). Overtly, Pakistan accepts that they provide moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri-liberation movement.
However, the GOI accuses GOP of also providing sanctuary, logistical support, combat-training and leadership to organizations that carry out acts of terror on Indian soil. In recent months, many in the international community have taken cognisance of Pakistan’s duplicitous behaviour. The UN Security Council has on four occasions considered motions to declare Masood Azhar, head of the (JeM), a global terrorist. In the most recent attempt, the proposal received 14 out of 15 votes but was placed on temporary hold by one permanent member, the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
END STATES AND PERCEPTIONS
End State 1: The Chenab Formula
Redraw international boundaries awarding all areas of the erstwhile state of J&K, North of the River Chenab, to Pakistan. Areas South of Chenab, which are Hindu-majority, should continue to remain with India. This might have been the end-state envisioned by Pakistan, at the commencement of the 1947 war. It also might still be an end-state that drives PJOs.
Assessment: This option is unlikely to find favour with any of the stake-holders, except PJOs, GOP and PAK. On the contrary, there could be consensus, except for PJOs, that the Chenab Formula is unrealistic and will fail to meet the aspirations of majority stakeholders.
End State 2: Implement the Accession
In this option, the entire erstwhile state of J&K will be reunited with India
Assessment: This is India’s official line even though the Shimla Accord recognizes the LOC. Implementing the Accession would be opposed by both GOP and PJOs.
End State 3: Independent Kashmir
Create a sovereign country reuniting PAK, with its’ Indian counterpart. Since this proposition is unlikely to find favour with Jammu and Ladakh divisions, they would have to be kept out.
Assessment: With opposition from both GOI and GOP, an independent Kashmir is unrealistic. Further, the landlocked state is likely to be economically unviable and politically unstable.
End State 4: Shimla Accord
The Shimla Accord recognizes the LOC and suggests that it could, in the future, be converted to an International Border (IB).
Assessment: Even though the accord was ratified by Pakistan’s Parliament, in reality, the GOP is reluctant to accept the treaty. Further, accepting the LOC as an IB would imply that people living in PAK would not be reunited with their Indian counterparts. Hence, the 11 million Muslims living on either side of the LOC, in the Kashmir Valley, may continue to be unhappy with this arrangement.
End State 5: Federal Structure
Grant more autonomy to the state of J&K.
Assessment: Article 370 limits the central governments’ powers in J&K, to defence, foreign relations and communications. A reduced role for the Federal Government conforms with the spirit of the Indian Constitution. Even if India were to grant greater autonomy, it would not address the fundamental concern of bridging the divide across the LOC. The discussion on autonomy is, therefore, a distraction from this more fundamental debate.
End State 6: Andorran Solution
The model is based on an area called Andorra, which was territorially claimed by both France and Spain. Based on an agreement in 1993, Andorra has been granted autonomy. It has its own currency and constitution, while France and Spain are jointly responsible for the defence of Andorra. Following this model, India and Pakistan would permit the erstwhile Kingdom of J&K internal autonomy, but with no external personality. India and Pakistan would be jointly responsible for the new entity’s defence and foreign affairs. All the areas of the erstwhile state, including Jammu Division, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, PAK and Gilgit-Baltistan, would come under an autonomous government, with its’ own Constitution, Flag and Legislature. Citizens of the state would be entitled to either Indian or Pakistani passports, depending on which side of the LOC they belong to. J&K citizens would be free to travel within the new state but would require visa formalities. For example, an Indian citizen of J&K intending to travel to Pakistan will require a visa.
Assessment: The Andorran solution was suggested by historian Alistair Lamb in 1998. There is no loss of territory to either India or Pakistan and the proposal also conforms to the tenants of the Shimla Accord of 1972. However, while there will be many challenges in implementing this solution, it would not require maps of either country to be redrawn.
CONCLUSION
For more than seven decades India and Pakistan have struggled to win the hearts and minds of the people of J&K. The time is ripe to make yet another attempt. The 1st Opportunity held the promise of a plebiscite, but that would have awarded a win to one party and a loss to the other. The 2nd Opportunity proposed to divide the erstwhile kingdom between India and Pakistan, but that also involves dividing the people of the land.
Could an Andorran solution be the 3rd Opportunity? The Andorran solution could unite the people of the state, without loss of face to either India or Pakistan. More importantly, a united J&K holds promise to repair relations between a people who have been fed hate for too long.
"We have fought the good fight about Kashmir on the field of battle …(and)… in many a chancellery of the world and the United Nations, but above all, we have fought this fight in the hearts and minds of men and women of the State of J&K. Because ultimately – I say this with deference to this Parliament – the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men and women of Kashmir; neither in this Parliament nor in the United Nations nor by anyone else.” - Jawaharlal Nehru in the Lok Sabha on 07 August 1952
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